






















































































































































The Term Securities Lending Facility: 
Origin, Design, and Effects
Michael J. Fleming, Warren B. Hrung, and Frank M. Keane
The Federal Reserve launched the Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF) in 2008 to promote liquidity in the funding 
markets and improve the operation of the broader ﬁ  nancial 
markets. The facility increases the ability of dealers to obtain 
cash in the private market by enabling them to pledge securities 
temporarily as collateral for Treasuries, which are relatively easy 
to ﬁ  nance. The TSLF thus reduces the need for dealers to sell assets 
into illiquid markets as well as lessens the likelihood of a loss of 
conﬁ  dence among lenders.
T
o address unprecedented liquidity pressures in funding markets, in March 2008 
the Federal Reserve introduced the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). 
This auction facility allows primary dealers—institutions with a trading rela-
tionship with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York—to bid a fee to borrow over time 
up to $200 billion in Treasury securities from the Fed for a term of twenty-eight days, 
with the dealers agreeing to provide other securities as collateral. They can then use 
the borrowed Treasuries, which are relatively easy to ﬁ  nance, as collateral to obtain 
cash in the private market.
The TSLF was established on a temporary basis under the Federal Reserve’s 
emergency lending powers. It is one of several new liquidity facilities, including the 
Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), that are 
designed to stabilize turbulent funding markets.1 The TSLF in particular is intended 
to ease liquidity pressures in the secured, or collateralized, funding markets relied on 
by dealers. By increasing the ability of dealers to ﬁ  nance positions, the facility reduces 
their need to sell assets into illiquid markets and decreases the likelihood of a loss of 
conﬁ  dence among lenders.
This edition of Current Issues offers a detailed look at the Term Securities Lend-
ing Facility. We begin by discussing the importance of secured funding markets. We 
review the market conditions that led to the introduction of the TSLF, the features 
that distinguish it from other liquidity facilities, and the structure and operation of 
the facility. In addition, our study examines the ﬁ  rst ten auctions, conducted in spring 
2008, for early evidence of the program’s use and effectiveness.
The Secured Funding Markets
In the secured funding markets, participants borrow and lend funds backed by 
collateral. The most common type of secured funding transaction is a repurchase 
agreement, or repo: a sale of securities coupled with an agreement to repurchase the 
same securities on a later date, typically at a higher price. The lender of funds has 
1 Armantier, Krieger, and McAndrews (2008) and Adrian and McAndrews (2008) offer detailed descriptions 
of the TAF and the PDCF, respectively.2
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possession of the borrower’s securities over the term of the loan 
and can sell them if the borrower defaults on its obligation.
In a general collateral repo, the lender of funds accepts any of a 
range of securities as collateral. The class of acceptable collateral 
might be limited to Treasury securities or it might include other 
types, such as agency debt securities. The lender in this type of 
repo is concerned primarily with earning interest on the loan and 
having possession of assets that can be sold quickly with minimal 
transaction costs in the event of borrower default.
Repos play a crucial role in the efﬁ  cient allocation of capital 
in ﬁ  nancial markets. They are widely used by dealers to ﬁ  nance 
their market-making, risk management, and speculative activi-
ties. The transactions also provide a safe and low-cost way for 
mutual funds, depository institutions, and other market partici-
pants to lend surplus funds. As of March 4, 2008—a week before 
the TSLF was introduced—primary dealers were using repos to 
ﬁ  nance $4.5 trillion in ﬁ  xed-income securities.2
Repos are also frequently used by the Fed in its open market 
operations.3 Open market operations affect the supply of reserve 
balances in the banking system and thus inﬂ  uence short-term in-
terest rates. If the Fed wants to add reserves on a temporary basis, 
for example, it can purchase securities from dealers while agree-
ing to resell them on a later date. Most repos are arranged with 
a one-day term, but longer term transactions, commonly seven 
or fourteen days, are also conducted. The Fed accepts Treasury 
securities, agency debt securities, and agency mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) as collateral in its repos.
An important feature of repos is the “haircut” imposed by the 
lender of funds. The haircut is the percentage difference between 
the market value of the pledged collateral and the amount of 
funds loaned. A haircut of 5 percent, for example, implies that 
a dealer can borrow $95 for each $100 of pledged collateral. 
Haircuts further protect lenders of funds against the risk of 
2 Dealer ﬁ  nancing data are reported on the New York Fed’s website, <http://www
.newyorkfed.org/markets/primarydealers.html>. Adrian and Fleming (2005) discuss 
dealer ﬁ  nancing and the ﬁ  nancing data in detail.
3 For descriptions of the Fed’s open market operations, see Edwards (1997); “Fedpoint: 
Open Market Operations,” <http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed32
.html>; and “Domestic Open Market Operations during 2008,” <http://www.newyorkfed
.org/markets/omo/omo2008.pdf>.
Chart 1
Financing Spreads, January 1992–February 2008
Basis points 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Bloomberg L.P.
Note: The chart plots monthly averages of the daily spreads between overnight 
agency and agency mortgage-backed security (MBS) repo rates and the overnight 
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Repos play a crucial role in the efﬁ  cient allocation 
of capital in ﬁ  nancial markets. They are widely 
used by dealers to ﬁ  nance their market-making, 
risk management, and speculative activities.
borrower default. The size of a haircut reﬂ  ects the credit risk of 
the borrower and the riskiness of the pledged collateral.
Introduction of the TSLF
The private funding markets—where dealers usually ﬁ  nance 
their positions—were severely impaired in early 2008. Lenders 
of funds, worried about the value of collateral as well as the credit 
risk of counterparties, became increasingly concerned about 
losses on repurchase agreements. They responded by increas-
ing haircuts—reducing the amount they were willing to lend for 
a given amount of collateral—and by halting lending against 
certain types of collateral altogether.4
Lenders also responded by demanding greater compensa-
tion—in the form of higher relative interest rates—for accepting 
riskier collateral (Chart 1). For example, from 1992 to 2006, the 
overnight ﬁ  nancing spreads between agency debt securities and 
Treasury securities and between agency MBS and Treasury secu-
rities averaged 2 and 5 basis points, respectively. That is, a dealer 
pledging agency debt securities or agency MBS as collateral 
typically paid only slightly more interest to borrow funds than 
did a dealer pledging Treasury securities. Over the ﬁ  rst two 
months of 2008, these spreads soared to an average of 49 and 
55 basis points, respectively.
These types of disruptions to the ability to ﬁ  nance positions 
in the repo market compel dealers to seek alternative funding 
4 See, for example, “Repo Market Funding,” Financial Times, March 11, 2008, and 
“Another Source of Quick Cash Dries Up—Firms Rethink Reliance on ‘Repo’ Financing 
as Conditions Tighten,” Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2008.  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   3
sources or to liquidate positions. However, a dealer may be unable 
to borrow elsewhere, and market illiquidity may make sales of 
securities impractical. In such a scenario, a dealer might have to 
ﬁ  le for bankruptcy. It was widely reported that the inability of 
Bear Stearns to access the repo market was an important factor 
in its near-collapse and its purchase by J.P. Morgan Chase.5
In this environment of funding market stress, the Federal 
Reserve introduced the TSLF “to promote liquidity in the ﬁ  nanc-
ing markets for Treasury and other collateral and thus to foster 
the functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets more generally.”6 The facility 
allows primary dealers over time to borrow up to $200 billion in 
Treasury securities for a term of twenty-eight days by pledging as 
collateral other securities, including agency debt securities and 
MBS. Collateral that otherwise may be difﬁ  cult to ﬁ  nance can 
thus be exchanged temporarily for Treasury collateral, which is 
easier to ﬁ  nance. The Treasury securities are allocated to dealers 
by auction.
5 See, for example, “The Bear Stearns Fallout: With Street Watching, ‘Repo’ Trading Is 
Light—Market That Turned on Bear Stearns Remains Cautious,” Wall Street Journal, 
March 18, 2008, and “TSLF Auction Could Be the Light at the End of the Tunnel,” 
Financial Times, March 27, 2008.
6 See <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080311a.htm>.
The TSLF thereby increases the ability of dealers to obtain 
ﬁ  nancing, especially those dealers relying on the repo market to 
ﬁ  nance less liquid collateral. By decreasing the need for dealers to 
sell assets into illiquid markets, the facility potentially improves 
the liquidity of those markets. In addition, funding pressures on 
dealers and the likelihood of a loss of conﬁ  dence among lenders 
are reduced.
The facility could also be expected to improve the operation of 
ﬁ  nancing markets directly. Use of the TSLF increases the supply 
of Treasury collateral in the market and reduces the supply of less 
liquid collateral. The changes in supply should reduce the private 
market costs of ﬁ  nancing less liquid collateral relative to Treasury 
collateral. Moreover, by enabling dealers to ﬁ  nance less liquid 
collateral, the TSLF should increase dealer willingness to make 
markets for their customers in the less liquid collateral.
How the TSLF Compares with Other Liquidity Facilities
The Term Securities Lending Facility differs from the Fed’s other 
new liquidity facilities in a variety of ways (Table 1).7 Most nota-
bly, the TSLF is available to primary dealers and thus addresses 
conditions in the secured funding markets relied on by the deal-
ers. In contrast, the Fed’s new Term Discount Window Program 
and Term Auction Facility, like its long-standing discount window 
facility, are available only to depository institutions and therefore 
address conditions in the unsecured funding markets relied on by 
these institutions.
7 We limit our discussion to facilities in place as of May 2008. The TSLF Options 
Program, announced in July 2008, expands the amount of Treasury collateral available 
under the TSLF; additional facilities, announced later in 2008, are intended to provide 
liquidity to money market mutual funds, money market investors, and issuers of 
commercial paper and asset-backed securities.
Table 1
New Federal Reserve Liquidity Facilities











Announcement date August 17, 2007 December 12, 2007 March 7, 2008 March 11, 2008 March 16, 2008
Eligible borrowers Depository institutions Depository institutions Primary dealers Primary dealers Primary dealers
Facility type Standing Auction Auction Auction Standing
Operation frequency As requested Every other week Typically weekly Weekly As requested
Type of borrowing Funds Funds Funds U.S. Treasury securities Funds






U.S. Treasury securities, 
agency debt securities, agency 
mortgage-backed securities
U.S. Treasury securities, 






Reserves impact? Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York,<http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/Forms_of_Fed_Lending.pdf>.
The TSLF [Term Securities Lending Facility] . . . 
increases the ability of dealers to obtain ﬁ  nancing, 
especially those dealers relying on the repo market 
to ﬁ  nance less liquid collateral. 4
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The TSLF is closely related to the Primary Dealer Credit Facil-
ity, which is also available to primary dealers. A key difference, 
however, is that the PDCF is a standing facility whereas the TSLF 
is an auction facility. As a standing facility, the PDCF offers the 
advantage of availability on a continuous, as-needed basis. It also 
accepts a broader class of securities as collateral.
An auction facility, however, may be more attractive to dealers. 
An ongoing obstacle to the effectiveness of the Fed’s discount 
window, a standing facility, is bank reluctance to use the win-
dow because of a perceived stigma. The stigma arises from the 
concern that adverse inferences will be drawn about a bank’s 
creditworthiness if its borrowing were to become known. An 
auction facility may overcome this stigma because it allows deal-
ers to approach the Fed collectively rather than individually and 
because borrowing rates are set at auction and not at a premium 
by the Fed.8
The TSLF is also closely related to the Single-Tranche Open 
Market Operations Program, another Federal Reserve auction 
facility available to primary dealers. Through this program, the 
Fed conducts twenty-eight-day repos in which dealers obtain 
cash by delivering as collateral any type of securities eligible as 
collateral in conventional open market operations. The longer 
term of these operations, relative to conventional open market 
operations, is intended to address liquidity pressures in the term 
funding markets—where funding occurs for periods longer than 
a day.
The TSLF differs from the single-tranche program—and 
from all of the other new facilities—in that it has no impact on 
the supply of bank reserves. The facility does not affect reserves 
because it involves the exchange of securities for securities. Other 
8 The TAF is thought to have largely overcome the stigma problem for these reasons 
(see, for example, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s May 13, 2008, speech 
on “Liquidity Provision by the Federal Reserve,” <http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke20080513.htm>). While the stigma has historically 
described bank reluctance to borrow from the discount window, press reports suggest 
that a similar stigma may explain the lack of PDCF borrowing by primary dealers 
(“Fed Watch: In Vexing Trend, Primary Dealers Shun Fed Liquidity,” Dow Jones 
Newswires, September 12, 2008).
facilities affect reserves because they entail the exchange of secu-
rities or other collateral for cash. Even when these other facilities 
are used by dealers rather than depository institutions, reserves 
are affected because the dealers must add or withdraw cash from 
their clearing bank accounts as a result of the operations. 
Because the TSLF has no impact on bank reserves, the 
facility does not directly affect the Fed’s implementation of 
interest rate policy. That is, the Fed need not add or drain 
funds to maintain bank reserves at their desired level.9 
This “reserve-neutrality” feature makes the TSLF unusually 
flexible in terms of size; indeed, the facility is ultimately con-
strained only by the overall quantity of the Fed’s holdings of 
general Treasury collateral. In particular, the program can be 
scaled up or down in size quickly, as evidenced by the initial 
operation size of $75 billion.
The reserve-neutrality feature also eliminates the need for 
offsetting operations if an auction subscription is below the 
offered amount. As a result, the Fed does not have to make 
frequent adjustments to auction offering sizes and the TSLF 
can function much like a standing facility in meeting dealer 
borrowing needs. Fluctuations in facility use, in either direc-
tion, do not necessitate other actions by the Fed’s Trading 
Desk, such as security purchases, sales, or redemptions.
In contrast, facilities with an impact on reserves typically 
require offsetting operations. The amount outstanding through 
such facilities must be changed gradually, given the Fed’s desire 
to minimize market disruption from ofﬁ  cial operations. The 
Single-Tranche Open Market Operations Program thus began 
with an operation size of $15 billion in early March 2008 and 
built to $75 billion outstanding by the end of April. The Term 
Auction Facility began with an operation size of $20 billion in 
December 2007 and reached $80 billion outstanding in mid-
March 2008 and $150 billion by the end of May.
9 The TSLF does indirectly affect the implementation of interest rate policy by putting 
an encumbrance on the securities loaned to dealers. That is, the securities are 
temporarily unavailable for other purposes. The Fed’s payment of interest on reserve 
balances starting in October 2008 ameliorates the effects of operations with an impact 
on reserves, but it does not, except under certain conditions, eliminate the effects.
The Term Securities Lending Facility differs from 
the Fed’s other new liquidity facilities in a variety 
of ways. Most notably, the TSLF is available to 
primary dealers and thus addresses conditions in 
the secured funding markets relied on by the dealers. 
Because the TSLF has no impact on bank reserves, 
the facility does not directly affect the Fed’s 
implementation of interest rate policy. That is,
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The TSLF also differs from the single-tranche program in its 
imposition of a minimum fee. The fee is set at a level somewhat 
higher than the cost of borrowing Treasury securities against 
program-eligible collateral in the private market under normal 
circumstances. As a result, the facility is intended to appeal to 
dealers only when the market is not operating normally. The 
TSLF is thus designed to be self-liquidating as market conditions 
improve.10 Furthermore, some TSLF auctions allow a broader set 
of securities to be pledged as collateral, a point we discuss below.
While the TSLF is similar in some respects to the Fed’s existing 
securities lending facility, the two differ in important ways. 
The existing facility lends securities on an overnight basis, 
whereas the TSLF lends on a term basis. More importantly, 
the existing facility offers to lend specific Treasury securities 
against general Treasury collateral as a means of promoting 
the smooth clearing of particular Treasuries.11 By contrast, 
the TSLF offers to lend general Treasury collateral against 
pledges of other fixed-income collateral as a means of pro-
moting the liquidity of the general ﬁ  nancing markets in Treasury 
and non-Treasury securities. 
How TSLF Auctions Work
The TSLF is structured to allocate Treasury collateral via auction. 
The day before each auction, the Fed announces the par value of 
the offering amount, the particular “basket” of Treasury securities 
it is willing to lend, and the collateral eligible for delivery against 
the Treasuries. “Schedule 1” collateral is all collateral eligible in 
the Fed’s open market operations—that is, Treasury securities, 
agency debt securities, and agency mortgage-backed securities.
10 Federal Reserve Governor Donald L. Kohn discussed this issue in a May 29, 2008, 
speech on “Money Markets and Financial Stability,” <http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/kohn20080529a.htm>.
11 Speciﬁ  c or special Treasury collateral markets allow securities borrowers to obtain 
particular Treasury securities from securities lenders to meet delivery obligations. 
Lipson, Keane, and Sabel (1989), Dufﬁ  e (1996), Keane (1996), and Jordan and Jordan 
(1997) assess these markets; Fleming and Garbade (2007) analyze the Fed’s existing 
securities lending facility.
“Schedule 2” collateral is Schedule 1 collateral plus other 
investment-grade debt securities.12
Auctions are usually held at 2 p.m. ET and are open for thirty 
minutes. Dealers may submit up to two bids. The minimum bid 
size is $10 million, each bid cannot exceed 20 percent of the 
offering amount, and each dealer can be awarded no more than 
20 percent of the offering amount. The auctions are single-priced, 
so that accepted dealer bids are awarded at the same rate, which 
is the lowest rate at which bids are accepted (also called the 
stop-out rate). The minimum fee for Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 
auctions is 10 and 25 basis points per year, respectively.
A dealer’s bid rate represents the rate it is willing to pay to 
borrow a basket of Treasury general collateral against other 
pledged collateral. The bid rate may therefore be considered 
roughly equivalent to the spread between the ﬁ  nancing rate for 
the pledged collateral and the Treasury general collateral ﬁ  nanc-
ing rate over the term of a loan.
Shortly after the auction closes, the Fed informs dealers of 
their awards and posts summary results to the New York Fed’s 
website. Loans settle on the business day following the auction. 
Treasury collateral is allocated to dealers on a pro rata basis—
for example, a dealer awarded 10 percent of the offering amount 
receives a 10 percent share of each Treasury security offered. The 
Fed reserves the right to substitute loaned general collateral each 
day to avoid providing collateral that may trade with scarcity 
value in the repo market.13
To mitigate credit risk, the Fed imposes a haircut on the col-
lateral pledged by dealers; thus, dealers must pledge collateral 
12 Schedule 2 collateral originally included Schedule 1 collateral plus AAA/Aaa-rated 
non-agency residential MBS, commercial MBS, and agency collateralized mortgage 
obligations (CMOs). Schedule 2 collateral was expanded to include AAA/Aaa-rated 
asset-backed securities starting with the May 8, 2008, auction and all investment-grade 
debt securities starting with the September 17, 2008, auction.
13 The Fed selects securities for the collateral basket that are not trading with 
scarcity value in the repo market; however, repo market scarcity can change over 
the term of a loan, resulting in a substitution. Such a substitution occurred on 
April 9, 2008.
To mitigate credit risk, the Fed imposes a haircut 
on the collateral pledged by dealers; thus, dealers 
must pledge collateral with a market value greater 
than the market value of the Treasury securities 
being borrowed. 
The TSLF is structured to allocate Treasury 
collateral via auction. The day before each auction, 
the Fed announces the par value of the offering 
amount, the particular “basket” of Treasury 
securities it is willing to lend, and the collateral 
eligible for delivery against the Treasuries. 6
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with a market value greater than the market value of the Treasury 
securities being borrowed. Moreover, the appropriate market 
value of eligible collateral must be posted on a daily basis. Dealers 
may therefore have to make collateral substitutions over the term 
of a loan if the pledged collateral deteriorates in value or falls out 
of the eligible collateral pool.
The First Ten TSLF Auctions
On March 27, 2008, the Fed held its ﬁ  rst TSLF auction, making 
$75 billion in Treasury securities available against Schedule 2 
collateral (Chart 2). Dealers submitted bids totaling $86.1 billion, 
for a bid-to-cover ratio of 1.15.14 The $75 billion offering amount 
was awarded at a stop-out rate of 33 basis points, 8 basis points 
above the 25 basis point minimum fee.
14 The bid-to-cover ratio is the total amount bid in an auction divided by the total 
amount allocated.
The high level of dealer participation in the ﬁ  rst auction, as 
measured by the $86 billion in propositions, was itself a positive 
sign. The strong initial use of the TSLF suggests that stigma was 
not a signiﬁ  cant obstacle for the program. The facility was there-
fore able to lend Treasury collateral actively against non-Treasury 
collateral as a means of promoting ﬁ  nancing market liquidity.
In the second TSLF auction, on April 3, the Fed made $25 billion 
in Treasury securities available against Schedule 1 collateral. 
Dealers submitted bids totaling $46.0 billion, for a bid-to-
cover ratio of 1.88. They were awarded the $25 billion offering 
amount at a stop-out rate of 16 basis points, 6 basis points 
above the 10 basis point minimum fee. This was the last auction 
to “stop out” above the minimum fee until the fourteenth 
auction, on June 26.
The third TSLF auction, on April 10, was the ﬁ  rst to stop out 
at the minimum fee as well as the ﬁ  rst to be undersubscribed. 
The Fed made $50 billion in Treasury securities available against 
Schedule 2 collateral, but dealers submitted propositions for only 
$34 billion. All $34 billion in propositions was accepted at the 
minimum fee of 25 basis points.
It is important to note that undersubscriptions in TSLF auc-
tions may indicate that market functioning has improved and 
that the program is operating as intended. An undersubscription 
may suggest that the Fed has set the minimum fee high enough to 
induce dealers to revert to the private market to ﬁ  nance program-
eligible collateral. (Recall that an appropriately set minimum fee 
motivates dealers to borrow from the Fed when market condi-
tions are impaired, while dissuading them when conditions are 
liquid.)
On April 17, the Fed, in the fourth TSLF auction, made $25 bil-
lion in Treasury securities available against Schedule 1 collateral. 
Dealers submitted bids of $35.1 billion and were awarded the 
$25 billion offering amount at the 10 basis point minimum fee. 
This was the last auction to be fully subscribed until the twelfth 
auction, on June 12.
Chart 2
Term Securities Lending Facility Amounts
and Bid-to-Cover Ratios, by Auction Date
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In the ﬁ  fth through tenth auctions, collateral schedules con-
tinued to alternate between Schedule 1 and Schedule 2, and each 
auction was undersubscribed and stopped out at the minimum 
fee. Moreover, submission amounts declined with successive 
rollovers—a sign of reduced borrowing demand. For example, 
only $59.5 billion was submitted in the fifth auction, when 
$75 billion was maturing from the first auction, and only 
$46.1 billion was submitted in the ninth auction, when
$59.5 billion was maturing from the ﬁ  fth.
A consequence of weekly auctions and monthly loan maturi-
ties was a ramp-up in outstanding TSLF loan amounts over the 
ﬁ  rst four auctions (Chart 3). Declining submission amounts at 
subsequent rollovers produced a pattern whereby TSLF amounts 
outstanding trended lower after the fourth auction. Despite the 
decline, $98.6 billion was still outstanding under the program at 
the end of May 2008.
TSLF Effects on Financing Costs
The TSLF was introduced to promote liquidity in the ﬁ  nanc-
ing markets for Treasury securities and other collateral. The 
program’s effectiveness is difﬁ  cult to analyze, owing to its broad 
objectives, the scarcity of detailed ﬁ  nancing data, and the wide 
variety of factors inﬂ  uencing ﬁ  nancing markets, including the 
existence of other liquidity facilities.
As we noted earlier, one way to assess the program’s effective-
ness is to evaluate dealer willingness to use the facility when 
market conditions are strained as well as dealer inclination to 
revert to private market borrowing when market conditions 
stabilize. Another way is to track the ﬁ  nancing spreads between 
Treasury collateral and non-Treasury collateral. At a minimum, 
the spreads are symptomatic of relative liquidity conditions in 
ﬁ  nancing markets. Moreover, a well-functioning liquidity facility 
could be expected to narrow spreads—either directly, by striking 
a better balance between supply and demand in the collateral 
markets—or indirectly, by improving market sentiment and 
reducing ﬁ  nancing uncertainty.
In fact, ﬁ  nancing spreads narrowed considerably after the 
ﬁ  rst TSLF auction, on March 27, 2008 (Chart 4). Just prior to the 
auction, the spread between overnight agency MBS repos and 
Treasury repos was 100 basis points. By April and May, it ranged 
between 0 and 20 basis points. Spreads in the less liquid term 
market exhibited similar patterns.
Interestingly, while spreads narrowed after the ﬁ  rst TSLF 
auction, they actually widened in the days between the program 
announcement on March 11 and the ﬁ  rst auction. Spreads were 
as wide as 210 basis points in mid-March. The widening suggests 
that the announcement itself did not result in improved market 
functioning, but that the actual operation of the program was 
necessary to foster improved conditions. This ﬁ  nding is not 
surprising because prices in overnight ﬁ  nancing markets on 
any given day depend on the ﬂ  oating supply of collateral in the 
markets on that day.
Chart 3
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Financing spreads narrowed considerably after the 
ﬁ  rst TSLF auction, on March 27, 2008.8
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The narrowing of ﬁ  nancing spreads after the ﬁ  rst auction is 
attributable largely to increases in Treasury ﬁ  nancing rates, as 
opposed to decreases in agency or agency MBS ﬁ  nancing rates 
(Chart 5). This outcome partly reﬂ  ects unusually low Treasury 
ﬁ  nancing rates before the ﬁ  rst auction, rather than unusually 
high agency or agency MBS ﬁ  nancing rates. In fact, agency and 
agency MBS ﬁ  nancing rates were themselves unusually low just 
before the ﬁ  rst auction.15
The larger change in Treasury ﬁ  nancing rates may also reﬂ  ect 
the design of the TSLF—the facility always offers Treasury 
collateral, but the securities that dealers pledge against that 
collateral can vary. The Treasury collateral offered by the Fed is 
unambiguously expected to put upward pressure on Treasury 
ﬁ  nancing rates by increasing the supply of general Treasury 
collateral in the market. In contrast, the effect on agency and 
agency MBS ﬁ  nancing rates is likely contingent on the collateral 
eligible for a given auction.
15 Overnight repo rates for Treasury, agency, and agency MBS collateral are usually 
close to (that is, within 10 basis points of) the fed funds target rate, but they were 125, 
95, and 25 basis points, respectively, less than the rate right before the ﬁ  rst auction.
In Schedule 1 operations, dealers can pledge agency debt and/
or agency MBS as collateral, reducing the supply of such collateral 
in the market and thereby putting downward pressure on one or 
both of those ﬁ  nancing rates. In Schedule 2 operations, however, 
dealers can pledge other eligible securities as collateral. In such 
cases, the effects on agency and agency MBS ﬁ  nancing spreads 
are ambiguous, depending on whether the market views agency 
and agency MBS collateral as closer substitutes for Treasury col-
lateral or for the other eligible collateral.
In any case, it is worth noting that the increase in Treasury 
ﬁ  nancing rates was a favorable development in and of itself. An 
unusually low Treasury general collateral rate puts downward 
pressure on ﬁ  nancing rates for individual Treasury securities, 
raising the likelihood of settlement fails (see Fleming and Garbade 
[2004, 2005]). Indeed, the impetus for the original securities 
lending program in 1969 was concern that settlement fails might 
impair the Fed’s ability to implement monetary policy (Fleming 
and Garbade 2007).
TSLF Effects on Settlement Days
The narrowing of ﬁ  nancing spreads after the TSLF’s introduc-
tion suggests that the facility contributed to improved market 
conditions. To establish this relationship more conclusively, we 
analyze changes in market conditions around individual TSLF 
auctions. In particular, we examine changes in ﬁ  nancing rates on 
TSLF settlement days. As we observed earlier, prices in overnight 
ﬁ  nancing markets on any given day depend on the supply of col-
lateral in the markets on that day, so any effects of the TSLF could 
be expected to materialize on settlement days.
The ﬁ  rst TSLF auction was associated with a striking 
increase in Treasury ﬁ  nancing rates (Table 2). Subsequent auc-
tions appear to have had relatively minor effects, with no clear 
relationship observed between net auction sizes and changes in 
Treasury ﬁ  nancing rates. After the second auction, for example, 
the overnight Treasury ﬁ  nancing rate actually declined 20 basis 
points, despite the addition to the market, through the facility, of 
$25 billion in Treasury collateral.
What might explain the disparate effects of the various TSLF 
auctions? One factor was likely the size of the auctions—the ﬁ  rst 
one added much more Treasury collateral to the market than any 
The narrowing of ﬁ  nancing spreads after the 
ﬁ  rst auction is attributable largely to increases in 
Treasury ﬁ  nancing rates, as opposed to decreases in 
agency or agency MBS [mortgage-backed security] 
ﬁ  nancing rates.
Chart 5
Financing Rates and the Term Securities Lending Facility
2008
Source: Bloomberg L.P.
Note: The chart plots overnight Treasury, agency, and agency mortgage-backed 
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The increase in Treasury ﬁ  nancing rates was a 
favorable development in and of itself. An unusually 
low Treasury general collateral rate puts downward 
pressure on ﬁ  nancing rates for individual Treasury 
securities, raising the likelihood of settlement fails.  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   9
of the others. Perhaps more important, however, was the sharp in-
crease in Treasury ﬁ  nancing rates after the ﬁ  rst auction. Once the 
overnight Treasury repo rate (a secured rate) had risen to a level 
close to the fed funds rate (an unsecured rate), there was little 
room for the rate to move higher, regardless of further increases 
in supply.
Agency and agency MBS ﬁ  nancing rates also rose sharply 
with the ﬁ  rst auction. The ﬁ  rst auction allowed for Schedule 2 
collateral, including non-agency residential MBS, commercial 
MBS, and agency CMOs. The effects on agency and agency MBS 
ﬁ  nancing rates suggest that dealers pledged this other collateral 
to the Fed through the TSLF, viewing agency and agency MBS col-
lateral as more similar to Treasury collateral. That is, the increase 
in agency and agency MBS ﬁ  nancing rates attributable to the 
additional Treasury collateral supplied to the market more than 
offset any decrease in these ﬁ  nancing rates associated with the 
reduction in other collateral.
Similar to changes in Treasury ﬁ  nancing rates, changes in 
agency and agency MBS ﬁ  nancing rates after subsequent auc-
tions were more modest. Moreover, even if one focuses just on 
Schedule 1 operations, for which the expected effects are less 
ambiguous, agency and agency MBS ﬁ  nancing rates sometimes 
moved in the expected direction and sometimes moved in the 
opposite direction.
Overall, evidence from TSLF settlement days reinforces the 
observation that the narrowing of ﬁ  nancing spreads during 
spring 2008 was associated with the introduction of the facility 
and with the ﬁ  rst auction in particular. In addition, much of the 
narrowing seemed to come from an increase in Treasury ﬁ  nanc-
ing rates relative to the fed funds rate, as opposed to a reduction 
in ﬁ  nancing rates on non-Treasury collateral.
Conclusion
The Federal Reserve introduced the Term Securities Lending 
Facility to improve the liquidity of funding markets. Although the 
facility shares this goal with other Fed liquidity programs, it dif-
fers from them in important ways. For one, the TSLF lends Trea-
sury collateral—rather than cash—against other collateral. The 
facility thus contributes to an enhanced ﬁ  nancing environment 
for dealers by more effectively balancing supply and demand in 
the markets for Treasury as well as non-Treasury collateral. Early 
evidence, in the form of lower ﬁ  nancing spreads between these 
two types of collateral, suggests that the facility is effective in 
improving market liquidity.
In addition, because of the collateral-for-collateral nature of 
the TSLF, the auctions conducted through the facility have no 
impact on bank reserves and hence no effect on the implementa-
tion of interest rate policy. As a result, the facility can be quickly 
scaled up and down in size. Indeed, much of the initial success of 
the TSLF can be attributed to the ﬁ  rst auction, which drew a large 
amount of participation.
The TSLF’s auction format also appears to have mitigated 
the stigma typically associated with standing lending facilities: 
dealers seem more inclined to use this program. Finally, the 
auction format’s minimum fee has evidently succeeded in
reducing the quantity of loans demanded when funding pressures 
are less severe.
The authors acknowledge James Clouse, Joshua Frost, Charles Jones, 
Karin Kimbrough, and Deborah Perelmuter for helpful comments 
and Michal Lementowski for excellent research assistance. 
Table 2 
Change in Financing Rates around Term
Securities Lending Facility Auctions
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March 28 2 75.0 145 110 60
April 4 1 25.0 -20 -20 -20
April 11 2 34.0 5 5 -10
April 18 1 25.0 0 -5 0
April 25 2 -15.5 -5 -10 -5
May 2 1 -0.9 -5 0 0
May 9 2 -5.2 5 5 0
May 16 1 -17.8 5 15 10
May 23 2 -13.3 10 10 10
May 30 1 -7.7 -10 -15 -15
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Bloomberg L.P. and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.
Note: Net auction size is deﬁ  ned as the amount accepted at the previous day’s
auction less the amount maturing from the auction four weeks earlier.
Evidence from TSLF settlement days reinforces 
the observation that the narrowing of ﬁ  nancing 
spreads during spring 2008 was associated with 
the introduction of the facility and with the ﬁ  rst 
auction in particular. 10
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